Boundaries · 1983
Correctional boot camps
Coercive military discipline seeks to produce immediate obedience, although that obedience is neither equivalent to rehabilitation nor does it by itself predict lower reoffending.
Correctional boot camps, also known as shock incarceration or intensive incarceration programmes, are short residential interventions modelled on basic military training and aimed at juvenile or adult offenders. Their architecture combines rigid hierarchy, direct orders, intense physical exercise, drill, training, inspections, physical labour, immediate sanctions for infractions and rewards contingent on compliance. They emerged in the United States during the 1980s as intermediate sanctions promising to reduce prison overcrowding, contain costs and lower reoffending through a brief, intense and deterrent experience. The available evidence indicates that they may produce transient changes in institutional behaviour, attitudes towards the programme or the use of custodial places, but the military-disciplinary core has not demonstrated a general reduction in reoffending compared with comparative sanctions; the favourable outcomes of some programmes appear to depend on added components of evidence-based treatment and post-release follow-up, not on military discipline itself.
Theory of change
The proposal assumes that a brief experience of intense military discipline, external control and immediate consequences can replace antisocial patterns with obedience and self-control.
Core ideas
-
Boot camps are correctional sanctions, not psychotherapies
Correctional boot camps arose within penal policy as brief residential programmes of military discipline, not as psychological treatments derived from a theory of the self, emotion, trauma or the therapeutic relationship. Their historical purpose combined cost reduction, relief of prison overcrowding, behavioural control and the promise of deterrence. This difference is decisive: an institutional structure that demands obedience does not become psychotherapy by adopting the language of rehabilitation. (MacKenzie and Hebert, 1996; Parent, 2003).
-
The model assumes that intense discipline produces stable self-control
The boot camp's central intuition is that an intense experience of authority, exercise, obedience, order and immediate consequences can transform antisocial behaviour into self-control and respect for rules. The theoretical problem is that obedience under surveillance demonstrates sensitivity to institutional contingency, but does not prove that the person has developed autonomous motivation, regulation skills, relational repair or the capacity to face the contexts that maintained the offending behaviour. (Wilson, MacKenzie and Mitchell, 2005).
-
Institutional behaviour and reoffending are different outcomes
Participants may show improvements during the programme in behaviour, adaptation to rules, perceived effort or self-appraisal, and still show no subsequent reduction in reoffending. This difference requires compliance within a controlled environment to be distinguished from the capacity to sustain prosocial decisions in the face of stress, substance use, peer pressure, violence, precariousness or lack of support after release. (Meade and Steiner, 2010).
-
The evidence does not validate the military-disciplinary core
The systematic review of programmes for juvenile and adult offenders concluded that boot camps considered as a whole show no general difference in reoffending compared with comparative alternatives. Military discipline, intense exercise and the aesthetic of shock incarceration have not been shown to be effective mechanisms in themselves for reducing subsequent offending. (Wilson, MacKenzie and Mitchell, 2005).
-
The possible benefits of mixed programmes are not automatically attributable to the boot camp
Some versions incorporated substance-use treatment, education, counselling, cognitive behavioural intervention or aftercare, and the results of these variants may be more favourable than those of purely disciplinary models. However, those elements are additional mechanisms and must be evaluated on their own quality, intensity and integrity; their presence does not demonstrate that military drill caused the change. (Meade and Steiner, 2010; Parent, 2003).
-
The model simplifies complex problems as a deficit of discipline
Offending behaviour may be linked to trauma, exposure to violence, substance use, mental health difficulties, school failure, exclusion, poverty, criminal networks, discrimination or the absence of community support. The logic of the boot camp privileges an explanation centred on obedience and discipline, and therefore tends to offer a uniform response to highly heterogeneous clinical and social trajectories. (MacKenzie, Gover, Armstrong and Mitchell, 2001).
-
Coercion may intensify vulnerability and distress
Settings characterised by strong hierarchy, confrontation, bodily demand and limited autonomy may be especially difficult for people with a history of abuse, trauma or violence. Comparative research identified greater stress and less improvement in participants with a background of abuse within boot camp-type contexts, which reinforces the need to assess safety, trauma and individual vulnerability before interpreting obedience as healthy adaptation. (MacKenzie, Wilson, Armstrong and Gover, 2001).
-
Community reintegration requires mechanisms other than military punishment
Reducing reoffending requires continuity between detention and everyday life through community support, treatment, education, employment, prosocial relationships, housing resources and strategies for dealing with substance use or violence. Aftercare and rehabilitative components offer a more coherent route to sustaining change than the brief, isolated shock of a military regime. (Meade and Steiner, 2010; Wilson, MacKenzie and Mitchell, 2005).
Influences
- Basic military training
- The logic of punitive deterrence
- Intermediate sanctions in the penal system
- Institutional control of contingencies
- Punitive penal policies of the 1980s and 1990s
Key references
- U.S. Government Accountability Office. (1988). Prison Boot Camps: Too Early to Measure Effectiveness. GGD-88-125BR.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office. (1993). Prison Boot Camps: Short-Term Prison Costs Reduced, but Long-Term Impact Uncertain. GGD-93-69.
- MacKenzie, D. L., & Hebert, E. E. (Eds.). (1996). Correctional Boot Camps: A Tough Intermediate Sanction. National Institute of Justice.
- MacKenzie, D. L., Gover, A. R., Armstrong, G. S., & Mitchell, O. (2001). A National Study Comparing the Environments of Boot Camps With Traditional Facilities for Juvenile Offenders. National Institute of Justice.
- Parent, D. G. (2003). Correctional Boot Camps: Lessons From a Decade of Research. National Institute of Justice, NCJ 197018.
- Wilson, D. B., MacKenzie, D. L., & Mitchell, F. N. (2005). Effects of Correctional Boot Camps on Offending. Campbell Systematic Reviews, 1, 1-45. https://doi.org/10.4073/csr.2005.6
- Meade, B., & Steiner, B. (2010). The Total Effects of Boot Camps That House Juveniles: A Systematic Review of the Evidence. Journal of Criminal Justice, 38(5), 841-853. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2010.06.007
- U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. (2013). Practice Profile: Juvenile Boot Camps. CrimeSolutions.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2008). Residential Treatment Programs: Concerns Regarding Abuse and Death in Certain Programs for Troubled Youth. GAO-08-146T.
- Lipsey, M. W., Landenberger, N. A., & Wilson, S. J. (2007). Effects of Cognitive-Behavioral Programs for Criminal Offenders. Campbell Systematic Reviews, 3. https://doi.org/10.4073/csr.2007.6